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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

CATHERINE BORGER,
Plaintiff- Respondent,
Case No. 16154
-vsLEE RAY BORGER,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for divorce and division of property based on the
Respondent, Catherine Borger's Complaint against the Appellant, Lee Ray Borger,
and on the Appellant's Counterclaim against the Respondent.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial of this action was had without a jury, the Honorable VeNoy
Christoffersen, District Judge, presiding in the First Judicial District Court,
Box Elder County, State of Utah.

The District Court granted the Respondent

a divorce against the Appellant and granted the Appellant a divorce against the
Respondent.

The District Court also made a Decree dividing the parties' properties.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant seeks reversal of Paragraph No. 3 of the Court's Decree
of Divorce awarding the parties' house to the Plaintiff-Respondent.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Most of the facts in this case which are relevant to the relief sought
by the Appellant are not in dispute.

The Appellant and the Respondent, were

husband and wife hav-ing been married in Elko, Nevada, on the lOth day of
March, 1970, (Tr. 4, 38).
At the time of the marriage between the parties hereto, the Respondent
owned an interest in a house in Brigham City, Utah, (Tr. 6) .

The referred

to house had been awarded to the Respondent in a 1964 divorce proceedings from
a Mr. Reeder.

The house was awarded to her subject to a retained one-half

(1/2) interest in Mr. Reeder, (Tr. 6, 24).
During their marriage the parties maintained the referred to house
as their residence.

In 1972, the Appellant paid the former husband, Mr. Reeder,

Twenty-Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00) to obtain release of his one-half (1/2)
interest in the house, and Mr. Reeder issued a deed to the house jointly to the
Appellant and the Respondent,

(Tr. 9, 10, 24, 25, 33, 34, 39, 40, 49).

After

the deed was obtained from Mr. Reeder, the parties remodeled the house and
made various improvements thereto, (Tr. 7, 8, 9, 25, 26, 40, 41).

The material

for the remodeling and improvements was obtained by placing a mortgage on
the house.

(Prior to this, the house was not mortgaged.)

There appears to

be some discrepancy as to the original amount of the mortgage but in any event,
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the mortgage was paid down by the parties to approximately Three Thousand
($3,000.00) to Thirty-One Hundred Dollars ($3,100.00) by the time of their
separation, (Tr. 27).

The balance of the home improvement mortgage is presently

the only remaining mortgage against the house. The labor for the remodeling
and improvements was performed by the Appellant. (Tr. 25, 26) .
Although there was no value placed on the Appellant's labor, it
obviously contributed greatly to the increase in value of the house.

The

Respondent estimated the value of the house in 1964 at the time of her first
divorce to be Fifty-Six Hundred Dollars ($5,600.00), and the value between 1970
and 1972, prior to the remodeling and improvements being completed, Twelve
Thousand Dollars ( $12,000. 00), and the Respondent places the value of the house
at the present time at Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00), (Tr. 19, 26, 27).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION REGARDING DIVISION OF THE
PARTIES' HOUSE DOES NOT CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE.
The basis for the Court's decision regarding division of the house
is founded on the following statement of the Judge at Page 58 in the Transcript.
"I don't believe that the defendant acquired a half interest in
the home by paying off to Mr. Reeder or providing the money
that was paid to him to liquidate his interest. 11
The only evidence in this case regarding the Respondent's ownership of the house at the time of the parties' marriage is that she owned the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-3Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.

same pursuant to a 1964 Divorce Decree and subject to a
interest in her former husband, Mr. Reeder.

h<'~lf

(1/2) ownership

( See Questions and iinswers

between Line 19, Page 23 and Line 7, Pnge 24 of the Transcript.)

Also, the

evidence cannot be disputed that the Appellant paid Twenty--Five Hundred
Dollars ($2, 500. 00) in about 1972 to purchase Mr. Reeder's interest in the
house.

( See Questions at Lines 8 and 18 and Respondent's answer at Line 21,

Page 24 of the Transcript.)
It is further beyond dispute that at the time the Appellant's Twenty-

Five Hundred Dollars ($2, 500. 00) was paid to Mr. Reeder, he made a deed
conveying his interest to the Appellant.

(See Question at Line 12 and answer

at Line 15, Page 25 of Transcript, and Questions and Answers between Line 6
and Line 25, Page .39 of Transcript.)
There is no basis in the evidence from which the Trial Judge could
conclude that the Appellant did not purchase Mr. Reeder's interest, whatever
that was, and secondly the only conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence
is that Mr. Reeder's interest was a one-half (1/2) ownership interest.
The Appellant recognizes the fact that it is the exclusive province
of the trior of fact to judge the weight and credibility of the evidence.
Holland v. Brown, 15 Utah 2d 422, 394 P. 2d 77.

However, the Appellant

also recognizes that there are limitations on said province of the trior of
fact as has been so clearly stated by this Court in Lemmon v. Denver

&

Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 4 Utah 2d 255, 292 P.2d 849, as
follows:
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"The only limitation thereon is that if findings are made which
are not supported by any substantial evidence, or the evidence
is so clear that all reasonable minds would find one way, so that
a verdict contrary thereto must have resulted from passion or prejudice, or misconception of the law or the evidence, or in arbitrary
disregard thereof, the Court will exercise its inherent supervisory
powers to administer justice and will set the verdict aside. 11
The Appellant contends that this case is the type of case referred
to by the Court in Super Tire Market, Inc. v. Rollins, 18 Utah 2d 122, 417
P. 2d 132, when it is stated:
"One of the most salutary features of our system of government is that throughout its entire structure there are checks
and balances against the exercise of despotic power or unreasoning action by any official or functionary. It is the duty of the
Court to safeguard these protections; and they themselves should
not be exempted from this principle. This is the basis for the
right of review on appeal whereby a court or jury may be
prevented from obdurately refusing to accept credible uncontradicted evidence without any rational basis for doing so. 11
POINT II.
THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION REFUSING TO ALLOCATE
THE INCREASE IN VALUE OF THE HOUSE RESULTING
FROM THE APPELLANT'S LABOR IS NOT SUPPORTED BY
THE WEIGHT AND CREDIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE.
The decision of the Lower Court not to allocate the increase in
value of the house resulting from joint monies and efforts expended by the
parties is based on the following statement from the Judge beginning at
Line 12, Page 60 of the Transcript.
"As to joint monies and joint effort that went into labor and
mortgage payments, for improvements, I feel they both, as a
result of whatever those joint efforts were and joint payments,
both had and received the use of the house without other payments involved, and I think one offsets the other. 11
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As a result of the Judge's conclusion, the Court refused to allocate
between the parties any of the increase in value which resulted f1·om the
Appellant's labor in remodeling the l1ouse.

In fact, the Court granted all of

said increase to the Respondent even though it was just as apparent that
she received the use of the house without any rent or other payrr,cnts just the
same as did the Appellant.
CONCLUSION
In view of the Lower Court's failure to follow the evidence in
this case, the Court should remand this case to the Lower Court with
directions to find that the Appellant is entitled to a one-half (1/2) ownership interest in the house and to determine the value of said interest and
to make an equitable division consistent therewith.
Respectfully submitted by,
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Jack H. Molgard
Attorney for the Defendant- Appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

